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Market Reforms and Consumption Puzzles in China

December 2008
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Abstract: China exhibits above average savings and below average consumption as shares of
total economic activity when compared with other countries. At the same time, to create more
balanced growth at home and rebalance key bilateral trade and capital flow relationships, China’s
leadership is trying to increase domestic demand. To complement studies that investigate the
high rate of savings in China, this study focuses on the variation in consumption as a share of
GDP across provinces between 1979 and 2004. Drawing on well-established consumption
theories and work done on savings behavior in China, this paper develops an empirical
investigation of the variables hypothesized to influence the pattern of consumption across
regions.
We find that the normal, economic variables have a small explanatory power if significant at all,
while the key variables influencing the macro consumption share are structural, and mostly
related to government behavior. For example, local government expenditure on health and
education is significant and has a relatively large effect on consumption. Consistent with this we
also find a positive relationship between consumption shares and the size of the state sector and
the share of tax revenue in GDP. We also find some evidence that financial development has a
positive effect on consumption shares. Our results suggest that in order for domestic
consumption to be increased in the future, new public and private options to replace the declining
security and responsibility of the prior state-dominated system will be needed.
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Market Reforms and Consumption Puzzles in China

1. Introduction
As economies transition from planning to markets, numerous structural changes are
expected to occur. In a command economy, government allocates resources directly via the plan
or indirectly via state enterprises. With transition, resource allocation would increasingly be
determined by households. In the case of China, in particular, overall savings was kept high
during the planned period, with consumption given a lower priority. With reforms, then, private
consumption would be expected to rise.
Looking at gross domestic product (GDP) accounting from the expenditure side,
consumption as a share of GDP has not increased with market reforms. Government
consumption has remained stable but household consumption has fallen (see figure 1).
Households report that they consume more and better quality goods under the reform system.
Retail sales and new shopping malls have grown tremendously along with incomes. However, as
a share of economy-wide activity, household consumption has fallen substantially (Mukherjee
2007). In addition, when compared to other economies such as India, China’s share of national
consumption in GDP is substantially lower. In the last two decades, China’s consumption share
in GDP averaged 57 percent compared with India’s 75 percent, and China’s household
consumption averaged only 43 percent compared with India’s 64 percent (see figure 2).1
China’s policy makers themselves have declared that domestic market development that
would allow increased consumption would be helpful for long-run, sustained growth (He and
Kuijs 2007, Lardy 2007). Policies to promote the domestic economy as the engine of growth,
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World Development Indicators, www.worldbank.org, based on 1990-2005 data.
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which includes consumption as well as better efficiency and innovation, are a centerpiece of
President Hu Jintao’s “balanced growth” strategy (Hu 2004). External demand has been the
primary engine of growth for China with exports as a share of GDP approaching 30 percent.
However, the challenges to shift demand from exports to domestic consumption are formidable.
For example, when savings are high, consumption will be low, and China has some of the
highest saving rates in the world (Kuijs 2005, He and Kuijs 2007). While impressively high
already, exports continue to grow. Moves to appreciate the Yuan, encourage domestic sales, and
lower export incentives have had little effect.
Analysts of China’s current market development stage often make an analogy between
the U.S. in the late 19th century and China today. The U.S. economy after the Civil War
increasingly brought regions together with the completion of coast to coast railways, the
emergence of national media, and the beginnings of large corporations that viewed their market
as national in scale from their inception. The Incorporation of America, by Alan Trachtenberg
(1982), eloquently captures this period of national market development and the effect on
American business and culture. Today, China’s leaders are building national highways,
improving rail and air travel, and encouraging investment in the western part of the country on a
large scale. Provincial and local level “self-reliance” of the past is giving way to these new
forces and policies. This progress would be expected to generate more domestic demand for all
kinds of goods and services, and serve as an important source of economic growth. Detailed
research by sector across countries conducted by the Global Institute of McKinsey concludes that
domestic competition in product markets is second only to macro stability in helping to promote
economic growth and productivity (Lewis 2004). Establishing an integrated national market and
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breaking local segmentation is vital for stimulating competition and domestic demand to propel
long-term growth in China.
There is debate about how successful national market development has actually been in
China. Local protectionism is not dead. For example, Young (2000) and Poncet (2003, 2005)
argue that China’s domestic market continues to be highly fragmented. However, Bai et al.
(2004) find that although local government protection is strong for industries with high profit
margins, the overall time trend of regional specialization of China’s industries has reversed an
early drop in the mid-1980s, registering a significant increase in later years. Park and Du (2005)
also demonstrate that regional specialization increased beginning in the early 1980s.
In addition to the ongoing debate over market integration on the commodity and industry
side, recent studies have examined capital market integration. Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2002)
study China’s provincial savings and investment rates at the aggregate level and argue that,
contrary to expectations, reforms have not made capital more mobile across provincial borders.
Other work, however, points to more normal market flows when the private sector is accounted
for. For example, after stripping out foreign funds, government appropriations and officially
influenced funds, Qi (2006) finds that the behavior of capital flows in China’s commercial sector
moves toward that of interstate flows in the U.S. and other advanced nations, suggesting a more
integrated capital market than previously thought.
The mixed evidence notwithstanding, promoting a national market that will allow
domestic demand to be a leading stimulant for growth is now high on the central leadership’s
agenda. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2006) put forward a combination of policies they believe will
work best in China to achieve balanced growth, including a decrease in savings, an increase in
service provision, and a reevaluation of the Chinese currency. He and Kuijs (2007) also suggest
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that policy changes are required to rebalance China’s economy. The bias towards infrastructure
investment, for example, has meant under-provision of health and education. Looking at where
China is today in terms of the rebalancing and domestic demand policies, Lardy (2007)
concludes that while the direction makes sense, progress has been uneven.
China’s high savings rate is at the root of the problems, but explanations for high savings
rates in China are so far incomplete. Based on a thorough analysis of China’s national and
sectoral flow of funds, Lin and Schramm (forthcoming) argue that a substantial portion of
domestic savings ends up in the informal sector and cannot be accounted for. They conclude
there are serious structural challenges within China’s financial system that are preventing a more
balanced distribution of resources.
Taking a complementary but different tack, in this paper we explore the state of domestic
consumption in China by examining variations in consumption patterns to see what factors
influence consumption rates, and in particular household consumption rates. We hope that this
will indirectly shed light on why consumption appears to be low in China’s macro economy
despite its move to a market system.

Most aspects of household consumption behavior in China

on a micro level seem to be fairly in line with other countries at similar development levels
(Clements and Qiang 2003, Wu 1999). Our focus, therefore, is on a macroeconomic and
institutional level of analysis, using cross-sectional and time-series data at the provincial level.
Our dependent variable is household consumption expenditure as a share of total economic
activity measured by gross domestic product by province. The data we use is collected by the
China statistical system and reported as the private consumption element of GDP, rather than
micro level, household survey data. The average consumption share of GDP in the reform
period is between .4 and .5 (see figure 1), while the average consumption share of disposable
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income on the micro level is over .8 (see figure 3). Hence, these two data sets are capturing
different phenomena. By looking at variations across provinces, we explore variables from the
literature that we have reason to believe could explain why consumption as a share of overall
activity is so low. By focusing on consumption, our goal is to complement the work that has
been done on savings behavior in China.
The next section reviews the literature on savings and consumption behavior, which leads
us to identify key, measurable variables to examine empirically in section three. The fourth
section reports our empirical results, followed by a conclusion.

2. Literature Review: Savings and Consumption in China
Figures for savings rates in China range from 30 percent of GDP (Modigliani and Cao
2004) to 43 percent (Kujis 2005) and even as high as 50 percent (Horioka and Wan 2007),
depending on definitions and time periods. One line of inquiry into these savings rates has
followed Modigliani’s work (1966) on the life-cycle hypothesis. Using time series macro data
for China from 1953 to 2000, Modigliani and Cao (2004) found that higher than average private
savings in China during the reform period can be explained by the high growth rate of the
economy and the one-child policy. The theory implies that high income growth rates would
result in higher savings because incomes of the working age population would rise relative to
those who are not working. In addition, with only one child, household dependency rates would
be relatively low, which is associated with higher savings rates. Likewise, if there are more
people consuming but not earning income (the definition of a dependent), then the average
consumption share would be higher. Consistent with the life cycle hypothesis, they did not find
evidence that income per capita was an important factor. Additional support for this result was
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found by Masson et al. (1998). Looking at pooled international cross-country data over time,
they found that lower dependency ratios and higher growth rates were associated with higher
savings. They also found, however, that growth rates raised savings more in developing
countries as compared with richer, developed countries, while the dependency ratio did not vary
much by development level.
In another application of the life-cycle hypothesis, Horioka and Wan (2007) test for
factors influencing household savings in China using a provincial data set for 1995-2004 based
on household surveys.

Their estimation includes income growth, the interest rate, the inflation

rate, lagged savings and the age structure of the population. They find that lagged savings and
income growth are the most important determinants of high savings in their estimations, while
the interest rate and inflation rate have mixed results, and the demographic variables were not
significant for the most part. They conclude their work provides partial evidence of a life cycle
explanation, and that if growth rates continue to be high, it is likely that savings rates will also
remain high.
Another approach suggests that people are saving in China in order to deal with unusually
high uncertainty due to the lack of ability to insure for health, retirement and other contingencies
especially as state subsidies for these items have declined without private options to take their
place (Wong and Yu 2002). Yoo and Giles (2002) also find precautionary behavior due to
uncertainty that is specific to rural households in China.
Research on consumption—the flip side of savings—in China has looked at differences
in consumer behavior across time, geographies, urban-rural lifestyles and income groups. Song
et al. (1996) use a permanent income hypothesis framework and a time varying parameter
approach to model consumer behavior in China comparing pre and post reform periods covering
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annual data from 1952-1993. They find changes in consumer behavior over time consistent with
central planning in the early period and with market reforms later. For example, they find a low
marginal propensity to consume during the planned period that is consistent with shortages,
controlled prices and rationing. With market reforms they find a substantial rise in the marginal
propensity to consume in reaction to suppressed demand in the early years, with a fall later.
Overall, then, consumer behavior was as expected, and their model was able to capture the social
and economic changes in China over time.
Another study using national level annual data from 1961 to 1998 focuses on uncertainty
and liquidity (Zhang and Wan 2004). This study finds that there is a major behavioral shift after
1983, and that liquidity constraints and uncertainty reinforce each other resulting in very low
consumption and high savings under the market reforms.
A few studies utilize cross-sectional data. Wong and Yu (2002) examine data from 1991
to 1998 to find increasing income differentials have affected people’s consumption habits. This
is consistent with varying consumption behavior between rich and poor countries more generally
(Seale and Regmi 2006). In the case of China, Wong and Yu point out, however, that some rural
families have done well, so that a simple rural-poor versus urban-rich characterization is not
accurate. Nonetheless, on average, rural households seem to exhibit different consumption
behavior as compared with urban households (Wu 1999, 2004), as well as different savings
behavior as reported by Horioka and Wan (2007).

3. Investigation of China’s Aggregate Consumption Patterns under Market Reforms
Based on this body of literature and the significant economic system changes China has
experienced in the post-Mao reform period, we develop an empirical model that includes both
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standard economic variables and a set of structural factors that have shifted along with the
changes in the economic system. Our study adds to the current literature by utilizing pooled time
series and provincial cross-sectional data over a longer period than the household survey data
cover. In addition, since the micro survey data shows that Chinese households behave in
familiar ways in terms of consumption and savings behavior, we are looking for other
explanations for the low consumption share puzzle in our approach.
The equation to be estimated for ( i ) provinces and ( t ) time periods is as follows:

C 
(1)     0  1Yˆit   2  it   3 rit   1 P1  ...   i 1 Pi 1  1 D1  ...  i 1 Di 1   i  it   it
 Y  it
Where:

C 
 
 Y  it

= household consumption as a share of provincial domestic product

Yˆit

= the annual growth in provincial domestic product

∏it

= inflation rate

rit

= real interest rate (nominal interest rate minus inflation)

Pi , Di

= provincial and time dummies

Z is a vector of economic system variables:
Sit: the state share of industrial gross output value;
Git: local government expenditure on education, health and culture as a share of total
local government expenditure;
Fit: the share of loans plus deposits in provincial domestic product;
Uit: the share of urban employment in total provincial employment;
dit: dependency ratios;
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y it : provincial domestic product per capita;

Tit: local tax revenue as a share of GDP.

The empirical model used here combines standard consumption determinants relating to
income, price levels and income growth with a set of economic system characteristics expected
to influence or constrain households’ consumption decisions. We use the share of household

C 
consumption in gross domestic product   as our dependent variable, where consumption
 Y  it
includes durable and non-durable goods. This is the share that appears to behave differently in
China compared to other countries. Our panel data set includes provincial data for 31 provinces
between 1979 and 2004.2 The variation across provinces allows us to explore possible factors
relating to differences in income levels and reform progress, in addition to the standard
consumption variables.
To test the life cycle model’s prediction that faster growth in income will lead to an
increase in savings and therefore a decrease in consumption shares, we use growth in provincial
GDP. Inflation is included with the expectation that higher inflation can cause households to
save less and thus consume more.
In theory, interest rates would also be expected to influence savings, and therefore
consumption, with lower rates leading to increased consumption. Nominal interest rates,
however, are available for China’s national economy but not by province, and only for more
recent years. We calculated real interest rates by subtracting inflation from nominal interest
rates. So far the reforms in China may not have progressed to a stage where interest rates
influence either consumers or savers-investors very much partly because the rates are set very
2

Please see the appendix for sources of all data used in our model.
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low (Economist 2007). Indeed, the market interest rates are actually often negative when
inflation is taken into account. So the normal relationship between consumption and interest
rates cannot be expected. For these reasons, we do not include interest rates in most our
estimations.
For the system variables in the Z vector, we include a number of factors raised by the
literature. One is the hypothesis of precautionary savings. To the extent that the state sector was
no longer going to assure households’ employment with the package of “iron rice bowl” perks
that went along with state sector employment, a reasonable hypothesis is that households would
adapt to this new environment of uncertainty. In this study we use the state share in total
industrial output value as a proxy for uncertainty, expecting that with a lower state sector,
families would opt for more precautionary savings and therefore consume less.
Another interpretation of the effect of the size of the state share is that provinces with
more state companies are able to obtain relative more funding from state banks since the banks
lend primarily to the large SOEs and not to the private sector (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2002).3
Having access to financing would help reduce uncertainty for those working at these companies.
It is much less likely, for example, that SOEs receiving state financial backing would go
bankrupt as compared with private firms. It is also more likely that they would be able to fund
higher wages and benefits than non-state companies. Further, while small and marginal SOEs
were being sold and closed in the earlier years, since the mid-1990s, stronger companies and
those in priority sectors have done quite well (Li and Putterman 2008).
A second, related factor that might influence household consumption is that of
government expenditure. If the government is taking care of certain needs, such as allocating
grain, supplying education and healthcare, etc., then households would not need to save for these
3

We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative interpretation.
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possible expenditures in the future. With reform, local government provision of services has
varied greatly across areas, and for some services, has declined. For example, if we look at
healthcare spending depicted in figure 4, we can see that the share spent by individuals has
increased steadily from 1990 to 2000 while the government’s share has fallen. The third
category, “society’s share” captures contributions by companies and other institutions and
entities. The data that are available at the provincial level, and that we use in our estimation,
represent the share of local government expenditure that is used for health, education and culture.
A third system factor we would expect to influence household consumption is the ability
of households to use the newly marketized financial system to smooth consumption over time.
In principle, with market development, liquidity options should expand and therefore not pose a
constraint to consumption. Commonly used financial development indicators are the percentage
of total financial assets to GDP (Goldsmith 1969) or money supply measures such as M2 as a
share of GDP. However, we do not have access to financial assets data for all provinces for the
period of time we study, and money supply measures are appropriate for cross-country analyses
but will not vary by province. Therefore, we follow other scholars and use the total deposits and
loans issued by all financial institutions as a percent of GDP reported by each province as a
proxy for financial development (Zhou 2004). We would expect this coefficient to be positive if
more financial development lessened liquidity constraints.
The fourth variable we use to capture changes due to reforms is the degree of
urbanization measured as the percent of urban employment in the total labor force. Other work
has shown that rural and urban households exhibit different consumption patterns (Wu 2004).
Household survey data for China show that the average propensity to consume in urban areas is
near .9 while in rural areas it is nearer to .8, and that the difference between the two has varied
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over time (see figure 5). Since provinces vary in their relative importance of rural activity to
urban, this difference could affect consumption patterns in the aggregate. Reforms have led to
rapid urbanization and significant job transfers out of agriculture into industry and services, and
therefore we expect this to affect consumption patterns over time as well. Hence we would
expect this coefficient to be positive, with higher urbanization explaining higher consumption
shares.
Our fifth variable is provincial output per capita. Cross-country studies have shown that
consumption patterns in rich countries differ from those in poor countries (Clements and Qiang
2003). In particular, consistent with Engel’s law, expenditure shares on food in rich countries
were lower than poorer countries. Also, reforms have benefited some provinces more than
others, as reflected in varying growth rates and average incomes. We hypothesize that
consumption patterns would differ across provinces as well. But due to possible multiple
influences, the relationship could go in either direction. For example, as households become
richer they spend a smaller proportion of income on food, but it may be that richer families have
a choice to spend relatively more on housing.
To account for the dependency burden for households on consumption from the life-cycle
model, we use the dependency ratio as our sixth variable. This ratio is defined as the proportion
of the population that is either under 14 or over 65. We expect a positive relationship here, as
more dependents would mean more consumer expenditure on average.
Finally, our seventh variable is the overall provincial tax burden. Since our dependent
variable uses provincial gross output in the denominator rather than a disposable income
measure, we add this tax variable to see what effect it has on overall consumption. For provinces
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where the tax burden is higher, we would expect the consumption share to be lower. The
measure is the share of tax revenue in provincial GDP.

4. Estimation and Results
We begin our estimation with a pooled, cross-provincial fixed effect model. One of the
advantages of this approach is that it controls for omitted variables that vary across provinces but
do not change over time. For example, people’s life styles differ depending on what part of the
country they live in, and this may affect household consumption behavior. In addition, vast
differences in economic, industrial and fiscal structures across provinces are likely to influence
household consumption. The intercepts generated for each province in this model should absorb
the influences of these omitted variables that differ for each province but are constant over time.
We then add time-fixed effects to control for variables that are constant across provinces
but evolve over time. For example, we see the growth of private industry, elimination of the
“iron rice bowl,” shrinking influence of state sectors, introduction of new healthcare regimes,
changes in employment benefits, etc., nationwide as economic reforms deepen in China.
Table 1 reports our descriptive statistics as well as the between-province standard
deviation and within-province standard deviation (over the entire time period) of each variable in
our model. This table confirms the considerable variations of the dependent and independent
variables of interest in our data set.
Model 1 reported in table 2 includes the standard growth and inflation variables and the
economic system variables using the full data set from 1979-2004 with provincial fixed effects as
represented by equation (1). This model is estimated with ordinary least squares. The Fstatistics of the test on the significance of provincial fixed effects show that there are significant
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variations among provinces. The growth rate of provincial income is significant and negative,
reflecting that consumption tends to lag behind growth as suggested by the life cycle model,
however inflation is insignificant.
Our two main economic system variables, the size of the state sector and local
government spending on health and education, are both significant and positive as expected with
government spending resulting in a substantially larger coefficient (.67 compared with .07). The
strong effects from these two factors are consistent with how the economic system in China has
changed during the reform period. While the state sector has declined with reforms, when it still
exists it provides more employment security and corporate responsibility to cover an individual’s
healthcare and housing costs as well as better retirement security than the non-state sector.
These benefits help reduce the uncertainty brought by economic reforms pushing toward a
market system, therefore reducing the need for precautionary savings. Similar reasons apply to
the governments’ efforts to provide more health care and education services to the residents,
which will also reduce precautionary savings for possible medical needs or education cost for
children.
The next two variables, financial development and urbanization were not significant in
this specification. Financial development does become significant in later models but the degree
of urbanization does not explain consumption shares in our study.
The dependency variable was significant but was negative, implying higher savings when
there were more children and elderly. This is the opposite of what the life cycle theory predicts.
The Horioka and Wan (2007) study based on Chinese household survey data also could not
establish an expected pattern or significance for their demographic variables. They cite another
study (Chamon and Prasad 2006) using the same data set that found savings increased with age
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and was the highest for the elderly. Since in pre-reform China saving for retirement was not a
household or individual responsibility or even an option, it may be that the uncertainties around
the many changes in Chinese society during this more recent period have influenced decision
making in unexpected ways. Perhaps, for example, instead of households having a higher
consumption share because they are caring for children and older family members, they try to
save more in order to insure that the children will be able to attend school and later college. We
know, for example, that the tuition for schools at all levels has increased rapidly—perhaps 25
fold for college tuition— and that this could affect household savings and consumption
behavior.4 According to a survey implemented by the People’s Bank of China, the fast and steep
increase in tuition and schooling fees has become the primary motive for household savings.5 In
terms of retirement, for centuries people in China relied on their children to take care of them in
old age. The one child policy may cause people to save more because they are less assured of
this safety net.
Provincial output per capita was insignificant. One factor that might lessen the effect of
different levels of development is that many people from poor provinces work elsewhere. To the
extent that they send home their earnings, then consumption would be higher than expected for
poor provinces.6
The tax variable was significant but positive, which is the opposite sign from
expectations. Here, a higher tax burden results in higher consumption shares. As this measure is

4

http://www.bzpi.gov.cn/Body.asp?Id=330.
See the report published by Bazhong Shi Price Bureau (Sichuan Province). Report available at:
http://www.bzpi.gov.cn/Body.asp?Id=330. There are many other similar reports on this topic. For example, see the
article on education expenses at the Xinhua News Agency (the State News Agency) at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2005-09/26/content_3544715.htm
6
We would thank Xuepeng Liu for suggesting that migration may be playing a role.
5
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not actually related to disposable income, but instead is the tax revenue as a share of provincial
GDP, it may in fact be measuring the importance of government instead of the tax burden.
Although model 1 provides reasonable estimates with useful implications for
understanding consumption patterns in China, the standard ordinary least squares estimation is
not correct if consumption is determined simultaneously with some of the other variables in our
models. For example, GDP data enter both sides of the estimated equation a number of times,
and macroeconomic variables in the same system may generate reverse causality issues, which
also might produce endogeneity.
We resolve these issues by using instrumental variables, employing generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimators. We implemented the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to
examine whether any of our suspected endogenous variables can be treated as exogenous and
reported the DWH test results (with the exogeneity hypothesis) in all subsequent tables. We find
that the GDP growth rate and GDP per capita can be treated as exogenous variables based on test
results. However, our state sector size and government expenditure variables are endogenous.
These endogenous variables by definition must be related to the residual terms of the regression.
We suspect that this correlation with the residual terms may be caused by other omitted variables
that affect household consumption ratios. For example, as mentioned earlier, the pace of tuition
increases for schools at all levels certainly affect household savings and consumption behavior.
These types of factors as well as government policies on social security issues and varying health
benefits for rural and urban residents are likely to influence household consumption behavior.
However, our data set does not include direct measures of all these influences as regressors.
Further, all of these issues (or potentially omitted variables) are closely related to government
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behavior, thus causing the state sector size and government expenditure variables to be
endogenous.
To correct for these problems, we selected the lagged values of the endogenous variables
to use as instrumental variables (IVs) for the corrected estimation. While local government
expenditure might be endogenous for the current period and therefore correlated with the current
period’s residual, the value from the previous period is probably not correlated with the shock of
the current period  it . For each endogenous variable, we tested up to three-period lagged
values to see if any of them could serve as an appropriate IV. We tested the IVs’ relevance to
the endogenous regressor as well as its exogeneity to the error term using Hansen J statistics
reported as the over-identifying restrictions tests for all GMM models. Model 2, Model 4 and all
subsequent models utilize the GMM estimation.7
The basic findings of model 1 remain robust in model 2. The effect of local
governments’ expenditure on education and health not only continues to be significant, but also
doubles in its magnitude (reaching from .67 to 1.17). In our data set for 1979-2004, the average
ratio of government spending on health and education out of total revenue is .25. An increase of
one standard deviation to .3 will on average raise the ratio of household consumption to GDP by
.06, which represents a 12 percent increase from a mean of .49 to .55. Again, the second
strongest effect comes from the size of state sector in the local economy. The GDP growth rate,
dependency ratio and the tax variable have the same impact on the dependent variable in model 2
as compared with mode 1, and inflation and GDP per capita are insignificant as before.

7

We tested our models with both standard two-stage least square models as well as GMM estimation. Both
methods generate very similar results. GMM estimation normally produces more efficient estimates under overidentification and the two-stage least squares estimator can be considered a GMM estimator with a suboptimal
weighting matrix when the errors are not i.i.d. (Baum 2006, p. 197).
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The next two base models (models 3 and 4) add time to our estimates along with crossprovincial effects. Because China went through major changes regarding the tax, banking and
corporate governance systems beginning in 1994 (Naughton 2007), we included time dummy
variables chosen for several time periods to capture the time trend in China’s economic reforms
and economic activities.8 Figure 1 shows that the household consumption to GDP ratio was
relatively stable until 1989. Therefore, our first time dummy starts from 1990 and ends in 1994
when China started a major fiscal reform – tax sharing system (fenshuizhi). The next time
dummy covers the period 1995 to 1999, the year that marked the beginning of China’s residential
housing reforms.9 Housing reforms changed the former scheme of housing allocation among
urban employees, which is likely to affect household consumption behavior. The last time
dummy variable covers the last time period between 1999 and 2004.
Model 3 is reported in table 2, and replicates model 1 except that these estimates include
the time fixed effects as well as the provincial fixed effects. The newly generated time dummy
variables are statistically significant and produce coefficients with a clear trend: over time the
coefficients decrease each year. This is consistent with the decreasing trend in China’s
household consumption to GDP ratio. Model 4 replicates model 2 (both utilizing GMM) but
adds time period dummies. Since DWH test confirms endogeneity issues for model 3, we will
focus on interpreting model 4, which controls the endogeneity in model 3.
Local governments’ expenditure on health, education and culture still remains the
strongest factor in model 4 although the size of the coefficient dropped from 1.17 to .9. The
newly added time effects most likely picked up some of the variations in the dependent variable,
8

We also estimated our models using one time dummy for each year, which results in estimating 24 more
coefficients in our model, and losing many degrees of freedom. This generated near perfect collinearity problems.
To capture time fixed effects while still resolving the potential collinearity issues, we constructed dummy variables
for time periods.
9
See discussions of housing reforms at http://finance1.jrj.com.cn/news/2008-06-28/000003797311.html
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reducing the impact of this variable compared to models 1 and 2. The state sector variable is
insignificant in this model, perhaps for similar reasons, although the tax variable remains
significant. The effect of the GDP growth rate on household consumption remains the same.
Inflation, the dependency variable, the size of the urban sector and GDP per capita are
insignificant with the added time fixed effect, but now financial market development becomes a
new factor that influences household consumption ratios. We see that higher financial market
development fosters more consumption, consistent with expectations. Financial development
has the expected positive sign, suggesting that better access to credit helps to smooth
consumption decisions and so does not suppress consumption. Recently, studies have shown
that better access to credit increases the average poor household’s total borrowing by about 62
Yuan per capita (Han and Hare 2008).
Overall, there are some changes in the estimation results by model 4 as compared with
model 2, but the strongest effect on household consumption remains the local governments’
expenditure on health, education and culture, followed by the tax share. We believe that model 4
with provincial and time fixed effects is the best model for what we are trying to analyze, and
hence is our preferred base model.
Table 3 presents a series of robustness checks on model 4. Model 5 re-estimates model 4
using two-year averages of all data. The results are fairly similar. The joint F-stat on all
excluded instruments (5.83) is smaller compared to that of other models, though it is significant
at the 1% level. We conducted further analyses on the relevance and strength of the instruments
to the endogenous variable for this model. The additional partial R-square statistics in the firststage regression are reported (16%) and show that the instruments do have fairly strong
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explanatory power to the endogenous variable – government spending. Hence we conclude that
the instruments are appropriate.
Models 6 and 7 use alternative measures of the size of the state sector. Model 6, which
adopts the state sector’s share of fixed investment as the state size measure, generated similar
results as the base model which uses the share of state industrial output in total industrial output.
Model 7 uses the share of state employment in total employment to capture the importance of the
state sector. The results of model 7 show that the share of state employment has a statistically
significant and positive impact on household consumption as a share to GDP. It seems that the
state sector’s influence on consumption enters through the employment effect (rather than the
measure of the size of the state economy as illustrated by models 4 and 6). Though the state
share in the economy is declining in the reform process by all three measures, the better
employment benefits of the state sector seem to boost consumption.10
Model 8 includes the variance of income across time for each province as an alternative
measure of uncertainty to the state sector.11 The more variation a province experiences, the
more uncertain people’s income. We would expect that this would dampen the consumption
share on average. This variable did indeed have a negative and significant coefficient. The
results for the other variables included in model 8 were also consistent with our earlier results,
with the added significance of the dependency variable.
As a further robustness check, table 4 reports estimates for the more recent period, 19962004. We include the interest rate because it is available for this period, although it turns out to
be insignificant. However, inflation becomes significant, and our other key variables—
10

DWH tests show that we can treat the state sector variable as an exogenous regressor so there is only one
endogenous variable in models 5-7.
11
The calculation of the variance of income gives each province a variance figure for all years in the data set (i.e.,
no time variation in each province). Therefore we had to drop the provincial fixed effect in estimating this model or
the income variance will lead to perfect collinearity as another set of “provincial fixed effects.”
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government spending, the size of the state sector, and financial development—continue to be
significant. We also see smaller first-stage F-statistics for models 9 and 10 (similar to that of
model 5). Since we have two endogenous variables here (the size of state sector and government
spending), we also reported Shea partial R-square.12 Generally, a very small Shea partial Rsquare indicates that instruments lack sufficient relevance to explain all endogenous variables.
Though our Shea partial R-square is not extremely small (6% for model 9 and 7% for model 10),
we did find that the instrument for the state sector variable has no explanatory power for the
endogenous government spending regressor, Git. Hence adding the instrument for the state
sector variable in the first-stage regression for Git adds more noise, which drives the F-statistics
down. This is also consistent with the significance of the F-statistics on only the two instruments
for Git (as opposed to the joint F-statistics that also includes the state sector’s instrument), as well
as the significance of t-statistics and p-value on the two instruments for Git in the first stage
regressions. Therefore, we believe the lagged values of the government spending variable are
still reasonable instruments for itself.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
We use various models and estimation techniques to examine what factors affect the
variation in household consumption as a share of GDP. Based on the life cycle hypothesis, other
studies found that savings would rise with higher growth rates in income, and we found the
mirror result that consumption lagged income growth. However, variations in income growth
explain only a small part of the variation in consumption patterns. In our study, the most
significant and robust discovery is that reducing motivations for precautionary savings through

12

The Shea partial R-square is a useful measure in the case of multiple endogenous regressors (Shea 1997). It takes
the intercorrelations among instruments into account.
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government’s fiscal responsibility at the local level will have the strongest effect in increasing
household consumption. All of our models show that higher government expenditure on
education and health has the biggest impact on increasing household consumption. The share of
the state sector also seems to be important as it serves a similar purpose by providing more job
security and better benefits than the private sector. While the positive results of this variable are
not as robust as those of government spending, the alternative measure which captures the size of
the state sector through the employment share was significant. This underscores the likelihood
that the state sector variable is a proxy for certainty. The share of tax revenue in provincial GDP
was also significant in our preferred specification and in most of the robustness tests. Contrary
to our expectation, it resulted in a positive coefficient and therefore may instead be reflecting a
higher role of government as a substitute for private spending. In most of our models the
significance of the development of financial markets to provide more financing channels to
stimulate consumption was also demonstrated.
The dependency ratio and inflation are not always robust regressors with significant
influence on household consumption to GDP ratios. Our inflation measure may suffer from the
same problem as interest rates—that is, the official data understate the real situation. The
dependency ratio, when significant, had the opposite sign (except in one case with the two-year
averages) from what life-cycle theory would suggest, but was consistent with what other studies
have found in the case of China. There is a need for further research to understand the effect of
changing dependency ratios on household behavior in the case of China. Separating the young
from the elderly to see if there is a divergence in spending based on the two dependency groups
would be one approach. Urban employment—our measure of the size of the urban sector—was
never significant, despite our expectations from other work that it would matter. In addition to
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the possibility that our official urban employment data fail to capture the very large “floating
population” of migrant workers in urban areas, this may also imply that while the types of goods
and services that are purchased may be different in urban and rural areas, our data does not
reveal any difference in overall consumption expenditures as a share of provincial GDP.
These results point to several trends and also raise additional puzzles. From this macro,
expenditure side view, private consumption has not kept up with growth in total economic
activity as measured by GDP. Though the focus of our study is to analyze the determinants that
affect the provincial variation in private consumption as a share of provincial GDP, one further
hypothesis that may explain the overall falling trend of the consumption share is that household
income as fallen behind overall growth. Indeed, several reports show that the compensation to
employees as a share of GDP (measured from the income approach) “has declined from 60% in
early years of economic reforms to only 38.7% in 2006” even for Guangdong Province, one of
the most wealthy provinces in China.13 In addition, others have pointed out that wages for
employees in private firms have not keep up with the GDP growth.14 This trend may reflect a
time-lag; however, the trend has persisted throughout the reform period and may be the result of
something more structural that favors capital over labor and producers over consumers. These
trends do not bode well for a reverse of the consumption share trends. In addition, as
demonstrated in this study, to help increase domestic consumption in the future, new options to
replace the declining security of the prior state-dominated system will be needed. As long as the
reform process results in more privatization without insurance options and ways to smooth
consumption and diversify risk, the incentives to save may overwhelm the incentives to spend.

13

http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/gd.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-07/11/content_13789316.htm. Also
available at http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2008-07-11/073415913142.shtml.
14
Article available at: http://news.0898.net/2007/11/24/347028.html
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Some analysts argue that the time for building China’s domestic engine of growth is
when growth is robust (Summers 2007). Japan’s experience shows that building domestic
demand in a downturn does not work. A response of Chinese consumption to wealth effects tied
to changing values of equities is already evident (Deutsche Bank 2008). Releasing competitive
forces across sectors and geography within China could help a great deal to stimulate domestic
demand. Building a national transit infrastructure, opening the financial sector, encouraging
rural development and crafting a competition law are some of the policy pieces already moving
forward in this next stage of China’s development.
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Data Appendix
Household and government final consumption and GDP (expenditure approach) data for China
are obtained from the University of Michigan China Center Database website,
http://chinadatacenter.org. Household consumption expenditure includes the total expenditure of
resident households on final consumption of goods and services.
The Michigan China Center Database also reports industrial output value by enterprise
ownership for each province over our study period. We took the gross industrial output value
from state owned enterprises (SOEs) and then divide by the total industrial output value of that
province to calculate our estimate of the “state share” variable.
The government expenditure variable is the ratio of expenditure on education, health and culture
out of total local government expenditure by province. These data are available at the Michigan
Data Center for 1978-2005. These data are also available in various China Fiscal Yearbooks
(Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian) and China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian).
The main categories under local expenditure are capital construction, enterprises innovation
funds, expenditure for supporting agricultural production, expenditure for government
administration, and operating expenses for health and education and culture. Our local
expenditure data are not the budgetary data, but are the actual spending data at the end of each
fiscal year. Our provincial total expenditure data do not include transfers to central government,
or the expenditure for using loans of national debt.
Inflation data are calculated from the provincial consumer price indices reported from the
Michigan data base.
Interest rates are financial institutions’ one-year savings deposit interest rates for households,
reported by various years of China Statistical Yearbook. Note that while nominal interest rates
are the same for all provinces, because the variation in provincial consumer price indices, the
real interest rates vary from province to province.
The GDP per capita data also come from various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook.
We estimate the urban share of employment by using the employed person statistics in urban
areas versus the total employed number in each province reported by the Michigan China Center
Database.
Our financial development indicator measures the total amount of deposits and loans processed
by all financial institutions as a percentage of GDP data in each province. These data are
available from the NBS publication Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years
of New China (Xin Zhongguo 50 Nian Tongji Ziliao Huibian).
The dependency ratio is defined by the population 14 and under plus those 65 and older as a
proportion of the total population. These data are available from 1990 to 2005, and were
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
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We take the local total tax revenue reported by Michigan China Center Database divided by
provincial level GDP as our measure of tax burden for each province. These data are from
various years of China Statistical Yearbook.
The micro-level survey data on rural and urban households’ disposable income and living
expenditure are obtained from the Historical Statistical Almanac for China’s Provinces,
Autonomous Regions and Cities, 1949-1989 and various years of the China Statistical Yearbooks
for more recent years.
Finally, we take the fixed investment data from the Michigan China Center Database and from
various years of China Statistical Yearbook. The share of state sector employment is calculated
using data reported in various years of China Labour Statistical Yearbook.

27

References:
Bai, C., Du Y.J., Tao Z.G., Tong, S. Y., 2004. Local protectionism and regional specialization:
evidence from China’s industries. Journal of International Economics 63, 397– 417.
Baum, C. F., 2006. An Introduction to Modern Econometrics Using Stata. Stata Press, College
Station, Texas.
Blanchard, O., Giavazzi, F., 2006. Rebalancing Growth in China: A Three-Handed Approach.
China & World Economy 14.4, 1-20.
Boyreau-Debray, G., Wei, S. J., 2002. Can China Grow Faster? A Diagnosis of the
Fragmentation of Its Domestic Capital Market. IMF Working Paper No. 04/76, IMF,
Washington, D.C.
Chamon, M., Prasad, E., 2006. Determinants of Household Saving in China, mimeo.
International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various years. China Statistics Press, Beijing.
China Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian), various years. China Statistics Press,
Beijing.
Clements, K.W., Qiang, Y., 2003. The Economics of Global Consumption Patterns. Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics, Supplement 35, 21-37.
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (Xin Zhongguo 50
Nian Tongji Ziliao Huibian), 1999. China Statistics Press, Beijing.
Deutsche Bank AG/Hong Kong, 2008. Negative Wealth Effect on Aggregate Consumption. Asia
Economics Special, May 19.
Economist, 2007. Economic Focus: A Stitch in Time Saves Nine, March 24, p.88.
Fiscal Yearbook of China (Zhongguo Caizheng Nianjian), various years. Chinese Finance and
Economic Press, Beijing.
Goldsmith, R., 1969. Financial Structure and Development. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Han, L. H., Hare D. 2008. The Link Between Credit Markets and Self-employment Choice
Among Households in Rural China. Working Paper, Reed College, Portland, Oregon.
He, J. W., Kuijs, L., 2007. Rebalancing China’s Economy—Modeling a Policy Package. World
Bank China Research Paper No.7.
Historical Statistical Almanac for China’s Provinces, Autonomous Regions and Cities, 19491989 (Quanguo gesheng, zizhiqu, zhijiashi lishi tongji zilian huibian), 1990. China Statistics
Press.
28

Horioka, C. Y.J., Wan J.M. 2007. The Determinants of Household Saving in China: A Dynamic
Panel Analysis of Provincial Data. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Hu Jintao, 2004. China’s Development is an Opportunity for Asia, Speech given for Boao
Forum for Asia 2004 Conference, 24 April, accessed 28 June 2007;
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/93897.htm.
Kuijs, L., 2005. Investment and Saving in China. Working Paper, The World Bank Beijing
Office, Beijing, China.
Lardy, N. R., 2007. China: Rebalancing Economic Growth. Working Paper, Peterson Institute of
International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Lewis, W. W., 2004. The Power of Productivity. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Li, W. and Putterman, L. 2008. Reforming China’s SOEs: An Overview, Comparative Economic
Studies, 50:353-380.
Lin, G.J. and Schramm, R.M., forthcoming. A Decade of Flow of Funds in China (1995-2005),
in: Yin-Wong Cheung Y.W., Wong, K.Y. (Eds), The Current Economic Issus Facing Pacific
Rim Economies.
Masson, P.R., Bayoumi, T., Samiei, H., 1998. International Evidence on the Determinants of
Private Savings. The World Bank Economic Review 12:3, 483-501.
Modigliani, F., 1966. The Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, the Demand for Wealth, and the
Supply of Capital. Social Research 33, summer, 160-217.
Modigliani, F. and Shi Larry Cao, 2004. “The Chinese Saving Puzzle and the Life-Cycle
Hypothesis,” Journal of Economic Literature XLII:145-70.
Mukherjee, Andy, 2007. China’s Consumer Paradise is Still Long Way Off.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid+20670001&refer=home. Accessed April 11, 2007.
Naughton, B., 2007. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Park, A., Du Y., 2005. Blunting the Razor’s Edge: Regional Development in Reform China.
Jingji Xuebao (China Journal of Economics), 1.2, 149-159.
Poncet, S., 2003. Measuring Chinese Domestic and International Integration. China Economic
Review 14.1, 1-21.
Poncet, S., 2005. A Fragmented China: Measure and Determinants of Chinese Domestic Market
Disintegration. Review of International Economics, 13.3, 409-430.

29

Qi, Li, 2006. Capital Flows and Domestic Market Integration in China. Working Paper,
Department of Economics, Agnes Scott College, Decatur, GA.
Seale, J. L., Jr., Regmi, A., 2006. Modeling International Consumption Patterns. Review of
Income and Wealth 52.4, 603-24.
Song, H. Y., Liu X. M., Romilly, P., 1996. A Time Varying Parameter Approach to the Chinese
Aggregate Consumption Function. Economics of Planning 29, 185-203.
Summers, L., 2007. History Holds Lessons for China and its Partners. Financial Times, February
26.
Trachtenberg, A., 1982. The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age.
Hill and Wang, New York.
Wong, G. K. M., Yu, L., 2002. Income and Social Inequality in China: Impact on Consumption
and Shopping Patterns. International Journal of Social Economics 29.5, 370-84.
World Bank, various years. World Development Indicators. Available at www.worldbank.org.
Wu, Y. R., 1999. China’s Consumer Revolution: The Emerging Patterns of Wealth and
Expenditure. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, U.K.
Wu, Y. R., 2004. Why is the Farmer’s Propensity to Consume Lower Than That of the Urban
Residents? China & World Economy 12.4, 112-22.
Yoo, K. W., Giles, J., 2002. Precautionary Behavior and Household Consumption and Savings
Decisions: An Empirical Analysis Using Household Panel Data from Rural China. Working
Paper, Michigan State University.
Young, A., 2000. The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s
Republic of China. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115.4, 1091-1135.
Zhang, Y., Wan, G. H., 2004. Liquidity Constraint, Uncertainty and Household Consumption in
China. Applied Economics 36, 2221-2229.
Zhou, L., 2004. China’s Regional Financial Development and Economic Growth, 1978-2000
(Zhongguo Ge Diqu Jinrong Fazhan Yu Jingji Zengzhang, 1978-2000). Tsing-hua University
Press, Beijing.

30

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Household
consumption
as a % of GDP

overall

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

0.49

0.11

0.20

0.86

N=

771

0.08
0.08

0.30
0.27

0.64
0.80

n=

31

between
within

Observation
s

Inflation

overall
between
within

6.74

7.42
0.63
7.40

-3.60
5.41
-4.96

29.70
8.10
28.75

N=
n=

749
31

State
Sector Size

overall

0.57

0.24

0.04

0.94

N=

786

0.13
0.20

0.27
-0.09

0.79
0.94

n=

31

0.04

0.13

0.43

N=

781

0.03
0.04

0.19
0.13

0.29
0.43

n=

31

3.14

0.27

8.10

N=

769

0.80
3.03

1.02
-2.77

5.13
82.07

n=

31

0.16

0.11

0.81

N=

766

0.16
0.03

0.15
0.16

0.72
0.42

n=

31

9.24

25.59

69.66

N=

496

7.37
5.71

31.55
24.16

60.11
57.66

n=

31

N=
n=

806
31

between
within
Government
Expenditure
on Health,
Education
& Culture

overall

0.25

between
within
Financial
Development

overall

1.86

between
within
Share of Urban
employment

overall

0.31

between
within
Dependency
Ratio

overall

46.97

between
within
GDP per capita

overall
between
within

4298.26

5825.77
3115.08
4953.50

204.00
1440.01
-9639.92

55307.00
16506.18
43099.08

Real Interest
Rate

overall

-0.73

5.33

-19.62

8.19

N = 434

0.60
5.30

-2.29
-18.91

0.21
8.90

n = 31

between
within

(continued
on next
page)
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Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

Tax Burden

overall
between
within

0.09

0.04
0.03
0.03

0.03
0.04
0.01

0.22
0.15
0.16

N=
n=

718
31

Share of SOE
employment

overall

0.75

0.10

0.34

1.04

N=

799

0.08
0.05

0.55
0.43

0.93
1.06

n=

31

20.44

0.00

100.00

N=

792

14.28
15.15

19.72
-9.45

91.70
113.87

n=

31

3024.44

1180.80

15934.93

N=

806

3072.53
0.00

1180.80
4043.65

15934.93
4043.65

n=

31

0.52

0.20

2.74

N=

806

0.53
0.00

0.20
0.69

2.74
0.69

n=

31

0.48

0.1

9.62

N=

765

0.11
0.47

0.67
0.08

1.21
9.24

n=

31

0.09

0.08

1.15

N=

676

0.02
0.09

0.81
0.098

0.91
1.14

n=

31

0.38

0.24

1.95

N=

806

0.39
0

0.24
0.81

1.95
0.81

n=

31

0.58

0.51

3.80

N=

806

0.59
0

0.51
0.77

3.80
0.77

n=

31

between
within
Share of State
Sector Fixed
Investment

overall

62.91

between
within
GDP Per Capita
Variance

overall

4043.65

between
within
Normalized GDP
Per Capita
Variance

overall

0.69

between
within
Micro rural
consumption ratio

Overall

0.83

between
within
Micro urban
consumption ratio

overall

0.88

between
within
Micro rural income
variance
(normalized)

overall

0.81

between
within
Micro urban
income variance
(normalized)

overall

between
within

0.77
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Base Models 1979-2004 (Dependent Variable: Household
Consumption to GDP)
Regressors
(symbol)

Regressors

Yˆ

GDP Growth
Rate)
Inflation

∏it
Sit

y it

State
Sector Size
Gov’t Spending
on health etc.
Financial Dev.
Indicator
Share of Urban
Employment
Dependency
Ratio
GDP Per Capita

Tit

Tax Rev. to GDP

Git
Fit
Uit
dit

Model 1

Model 2
(GMM)

Model 3

Model 4
(GMM)

-0.001***
(.0004)
0.0007
(.28)
.07***
(.17)
0.67***
(.14)
-.002
(.007)
.09
(.08)
-0.001**
(.0005)
6.03E-06
(1.04E-06)
.68***
(.11)

-0.001***
(.0004)
0.0001
(.0006)
.09***
(.03)
1.17***
(.16)
.006
(.007)
-.02
(.09)
-0.001**
(.0005)
1.66E-06
(1.10E-06)
.74*
(.11)

-0.001***
(.0003)
.0003
(.0005)
.004
(.02)
.34***
(.12)
.02***
(.005)
.05
(.07)
-0.0005
(.0005)
8.78E-07
(1.01E-06)
.19
(.13)
-.1***
(.02)
-.14***
(.02)
-17***
(.02)

-0.001***
(.0003)
-0.000
(.0006)
.03
(.03)
0.9***
(.19)
.02***
(.005)
-.04
(.08)
-0.0005
(.0005)
1.44E-06
(1.09E-06)
.42***
(.13)
-.07***
(.02)
-.09***
(.02)
-.12***
(.02)

Yes
No

Yes
No
Sit lag1, Git lag1,
Git lag2

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Sit lag1, Git lag1,
Git lag2

Dummy90_94
Dummy95_99
Dummy00_04

Prov. effects
Time effects
Instruments
DWH test
First-stage F
stat & degrees
freedom
Overidentifying
J stat
Time Range
# of Obs.
Adj. R-square
F-stat

79-04
428
.81
54.98

.000

.000

41.37, 3
14.52, 3

27.71, 3
13.35, 3

.41

.63

79-04
423
.39
25.72

79-04
428
.85
70.61

79-04
423
.51
32.56

Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels
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Table 3: Estimation Results of Robustness Test (Dependent Variable: Household
Consumption to GDP)
Regressors
(symbol)

Regressors

Yˆ

GDP Growth
Rate)

∏it

Inflation

Sit

y it

State
Sector Size
Fixed Inv. to
SOE
Share of SOE
Employment
Gov’t Spending
on health etc.
Financial Dev.
Indicator
Share of Urban
Employment
Dependency
Ratio
GDP Per Capita

Tit

Tax Rev. to GDP

Sit alt 1
Sit alt 2
Git
Fit
Uit
dit

Dummy90_04
Dummy95_09
Dummy00_04
Var
Prov. effects
Time effects
Instruments
DWH test
1st-stage F stat
& DF (Shea R2)
Overidentifying
J stat
# Obs. (years)
Adj. R-square
F-stat

Model 5
(2 year avg
data)

Model 6
(Alt. State
Sector Size)

Model 7
(Alt. State
Sector Size)

Model 8
(Add Variance of
Income)

-0.001**
(.0006)

-0.002**
(.0004)

-0.001**
(.0003)

-0.0009*
(.0005)

0.0005
(.0008)
-.002
(.02)

-0.0004
(.0006)

0.0002
(.0005)

0.0008
(.0006)
.22***
(.02)

-.0004
(.0003)

.74*
(.28)
.02**
(.006)
-.17
(.11)
.0005
(.0009)
1.12E-06
(9.96E-07)
.46*
(.24)
-.04**
(.02)
-.06***
(.02)
-.09***
(.02)

.95***
(.19)
.01***
(.005)
.05
(.09)
-.0003
(.0004)
6.49E-07
(1.03E-06)
.45*
(.13)
-.07***
(.01)
-.1***
(.02)
-.12***
(.02)

.13**
(.06)
.82***
(.19)
.02*
(.005)
.03
(.08)
-.0005
(.0004)
1.81E-06*
(1.1E06)
.41***
(.13)
-.08***
(.02)
-.11***
(.02)
-.13***
(.02)

Variance of
Income

1.09***
(.07)
-.02***
(.006)
.009
(.03)
-.002***
(.0005)
7.36E-06***
(9.89E-07)
.77***
(.13)

Yes
Yes
Git lag1
Git lag2
.08
5.83, 2
(.16)
.69

Yes
Yes
Git lag1
Git lag2
.000
17.57, 2

Yes
Yes
Git lag1
Git lag2
.000
31.65, 2

.95

.98

-.11***
(.01)
No
Yes
Sit lag1,
Git lag1, Git lag2
.07
166.02, 3
131.47, 3
79-04

224 (1979-2004)
.57
19.12

427 (1979-2004)
.51
31.22

427 (1979-2004)
.53
31.8

423
.47
58.35

Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels
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Table 4: Estimation Results of Different Sample Period 1995-2004 (Dependent Variable:
Household Consumption to GDP)
Regressors
(symbol)

Regressors

Yˆ

GDP Growth
Rate)
Inflation

∏it
Sit

y it

State
Sector Size
Gov’t Spending
on health etc.
Financial Dev.
Indicator
Share of Urban
Employment
Dependency
Ratio
GDP Per Capita

Tit

Tax Rev. to GDP

Git
Fit
Uit
dit

Dummy00_04
rit

Prov. effects
Time effects
Instruments
DWH test
1st-stage F stat
& DF (Shea R2)
Overidentifying
J stat
Time Range
# of Obs.
Adj. R-square
F-stat

Model 9
(1995-2004)

Model 10
(1995-2004 with
real interest
rate)

-0.0002
(.0007)

-0.003
(.0007)

0.001
(.001)
.08*
(.05)
1.04***
(.32)
.02**
(.008)
-.02
(.12)
.0004
(.002)
1.26E-07
(1.17E-06)
.40
(.35)
.001
(.01)

0.005*
(.002)
.11**
(.04)
.94**
(.43)
.005*
(.003)
-.07
(.09)
-.0002
(.001)
4.01E-07
(1.03E-06)
.34
(.32)
.01
(.01)
.006
(.03)

Yes
Yes
Sit lag1
Git lag1
Git lag2
.02
10.63, 3
1.58, 3 (.07)
.71

Yes
Yes
Sit lag1
Git lag1
Git lag2
.001
8.24, 3
1.19, 3 (.06)
.49

96-04
244
.06
12.29

96-04
244
.10
12.64

Real Interest
Rate

Note: * denotes 10% significance level, ** 5% significance level, *** 1% significance levels
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